R K Raina
New Delhi, Dec 20 (UNI) Bangladesh is entering a phase of serious internal instability marked by mob violence, erosion of state authority, and the growing influence of radical Islamist groups. The killing of Dipu Chandra Das, a factory worker in Bhaluka, Mymensingh, lynched by a mob over allegations of insulting religious sentiments, reflects a collapse of law and public order. The attempt to burn his body on a national highway and the paralysis that followed point to a society where fear has begun to overpower institutions.
This violence is not an isolated event. Since the killing of a student leader earlier this year, political mobilisation on the streets has intensified. Extremist groups, radical networks, and opportunistic political elements have exploited uncertainty and administrative paralysis. Police response has been inconsistent and weak, with growing allegations that security forces were instructed to avoid acting against violent mobs. In many instances, law enforcement agencies have remained passive even in the face of open attacks.
Minority communities, particularly Hindus, are again being targeted through intimidation, violence, and social pressure. Anti-India slogans and organised hostility point to ideological mobilisation rather than spontaneous unrest. Radical Islamist organisations have gained confidence, business activity has slowed, and industrial production has been disrupted in several areas. These trends signal a deeper structural breakdown.
The crisis has now acquired a serious external dimension. Attacks on Indian diplomatic missions in Chattogram, and attempted marches towards Indian missions in Dhaka, Khulna and Rajshahi, represent a direct challenge to international norms. These actions underline how anti-India sentiment is being weaponised as part of a broader strategy to destabilise the region and weaken India’s eastern flank.
India’s position has become more precarious due to prolonged inaction over the past year. At a critical moment, when large sections of Bangladeshi society expected India to play a stabilising and corrective role, New Delhi limited itself largely to caution and observation. This absence of decisive engagement created a vacuum that radical forces were quick to fill.
The failure in Bangladesh, however, cannot be attributed solely to political parties or civilian institutions. The central responsibility lies with the military establishment. The Bangladesh Army repeatedly chose non-intervention at moments when constitutional order and human security were under direct threat. It remained passive when mobs attempted to storm Sheikh Hasina’s residence with clear intent to kill. It stayed silent as widespread violence unfolded, minorities were attacked, and casualties mounted. It did not act when radical elements gradually took control of the streets, nor when the bureaucratic machinery became increasingly compromised by extremist influence.
The army’s inaction cannot be justified as respect for civilian authority. In moments of state collapse, neutrality becomes abdication. By failing to act, the army did not protect democracy, constitutional order, or national unity. Instead, it failed Sheikh Hasina, failed to correct violence on streets, and most importantly, failed the people of Bangladesh.
This silence continued even as radicalisation accelerated, public institutions weakened, and foreign-linked extremist networks gained influence. Such passivity has allowed forces aligned with Pakistan’s security establishment to exploit the situation, deepen instability, and push Bangladesh towards a more confrontational and theocratic trajectory.
Bangladesh’s instability has implications far beyond its borders. Its geographic position makes it central to South and Southeast Asia’s supply chains, border security, and maritime access. Prolonged disorder will affect India’s northeastern states, worsen security challenges along the India-Myanmar frontier, and disrupt regional economic flows. Given Bangladesh’s population density and strategic location, unchecked radicalisation here could prove more destabilising than in many other conflict-affected societies.
The immediate responsibility now rests with the Bangladesh Army. This is not a call for military rule, but for temporary constitutional responsibility. The army must step in to restore law and order, dismantle mob control, protect minorities, and create conditions for free and fair elections. The Election Commission’s stated timeline requires a secure environment, which cannot exist under current conditions. A short-term military-backed stabilisation framework, limited strictly to security management and election facilitation, is now unavoidable.
For India, the lesson is clear. Strategic patience must not become strategic neglect. New Delhi must engage more assertively with Bangladesh’s institutions, civil society, and regional partners. Clear red lines on violence, minority protection, and diplomatic security must be enforced through diplomatic, economic, and security instruments. Border management and intelligence coordination require urgent strengthening.
Global stakeholders, particularly Western governments, must reassess their approach. Political transitions cannot be supported in isolation from security realities. Conditional engagement tied to rule of law, protection of minorities, and credible elections is essential. Continued silence will only embolden radical forces.
Bangladesh still has the social foundations to recover, but the window for correction is rapidly closing. Failure to act now will not only destabilise Bangladesh but will reshape the security landscape of South and Southeast Asia in ways that will be difficult to reverse.
