For over two decades powerful elements within the Pakistan Army and intelligence services have relied on supporting militancy and extremism as a way to counter India and maintain influence in Afghanistan.
The Pakistan army is receiving a drubbing from Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters since it embarked on "punitive" action against them in North Waziristan bordering neighbouring Afghanistan.
Since it ventured into the area after its convoy was ambushed in July, the security forces have lost over 200 men, while more than 500 terrorists have been killed and thousands of civilians forced to flea their villages in the war zone and rendered destitute.
The magnitude of the problem of extremists having established unchallenged sway in the whole of Waziristan has not lessened, as it is so deeply entrenched, and has been allowed to grow. Apart from the political uncertainty arising from President Musharraf's refusal to hold free and fair elections, with full participation by mainstream political parties, there is a lack of conviction in the anti-terrorism effort.
This has led to spread of the menace in Pakistan in a big way. In the tribal areas the people are being forcibly moulded to become the support base of the terrorists. Other areas are simply "external" targets away from "ground zero" of the tribal areas, which have emerged as the largest base of organized international terrorism in the world. The reasons are not far to seek.
For over two decades powerful elements within the Pakistan Army and intelligence services have relied on supporting militancy and extremism as a way to counter India and maintain influence in Afghanistan.
Having nurtured extremists so long, Pakistan military leaders came to believe it was possible to please some and eliminate others, without a wider strategy to tackle the overall problem. A senior US intelligence official has noted that the best way to disrupt Al Qaeda operations in tribal areas was to pressure them and make them worried about "who was informing on them.. and who was coming after them."
His comments reveal that the peace deals made along the international border last September backfired by reducing pressure on Al Qaeda and Taliban elements entrenched in the area for decades. Not only have such ill-conceived deals made it easier for terrorists to plan and train for global operations, they have also contributed to the erosion of the foundations of the Pakistani state by fuelling "Talibanisation " of the society. Having tried--and failed--to produce results from the peace deals, Pakistan has no choice but to go back to the military offensive in these areas.
Washington seems willing to support these efforts with military equipment or resources needed to make the operations successful. Focusing on minimizing civilian casualties and conducting targeted operations with good intelligence would reduce the chances that a military offensive will fuel an all-out tribal offensive. Even before the Pakistan Army was forced to assert its writ in the tribal areas, following NATO forces intrusions in pursuit of the rebels, the US had shown willingness to stabilize the region with infusion of assistance to develop the economy and improve health, education and social services, which are abysmally poor. It has already pledged $750 million over five years for development of the tribal areas, of which $ 100 million are to be released this year.
This is in addition to several billion dollars in military aid and for services rendered to the US forces for operations against the rebels inside Afghanistan. The current "Al Meezan" military operation has involved extensive use of artillery and Air Force. Yet the terrorists have held 200 soldiers hostage, mysteriously without a fight. It is unheard of in the history of guerilla operations that so many soldiers chose to surrender and be held captive.
A section of the Army has long been suspected of having sympathies with extremists and Al Qaeda and Taliban. It is also possible that since the generals never took the matter seriously and therefore, under US pressure, pushed unwilling soldiers into battle in a random fashion, without proper intelligence or familiarity with the terrain. On the face of it, this is not a properly synchronized military operation.
Military spokesman Maj. Gen. Waheed Arshad argues that if the militants use local population and their houses as shelter, the security forces cannot be blamed for any collateral damage. The fighting has caused severe hardship to the people as all roads to the area remain cut off, as also power and water supply, and there is acute scarcity of essential goods.
There is an unannounced curfew due to the operations and all markets are closed. The US has noted that a large part of the problem stems from the fact that Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence Agency remains infested with Al Qaeda and Taliban sympathisers. Its former chief is now due to succeed Musharraf as Army Chief as reward for the work he has done.
President Musharraf, under pressure from this section in the Army, has adopted a tolerant approach to Islamists, who have been operating from Waziristan. This has increased the danger to the NATO and US forces operating in Afghanistan. Gen Musharraf has been advised that the military needs the support of the people to sustain a successful campaign against extremism.
This offers an opportunity to mainstream political parties, if allowed to fully participate in free and fair elections, without rigging or military pressure, to close ranks with the government and forge a unified front against the growing extremist threat to Pakistan. But, currently public opinion is very much hostile to Musharraf and the Army and the manner in which he staged his reelection with the help of the ruling party, with the entire opposition boycotting it and Benazir Bhutto's party abstaining.
Musharraf and his team ought to visualize the consequences of allowing civil-military relations to plummet further. Meanwhile the PEW Global Attitudes Project in its recently released survey 2007 conducted across the world says that support for suicide bombings has declined sharply in Muslim countries. It has noted that Taliban and Al Qaeda have significant support among the local population in Pakistan's tribal areas.
Lack of education and employment opportunities coupled with increasingly successful Taliban propaganda, helped by the local Islamist parties (which are ruling in NWFP and Balochistan) and intimidation make these areas ideal recruitment zones for extremists. Recruits are formally registered with the Taliban as suicide bombers and given a slip indicating their registration number. At any given point of time, there are hundreds in the line ready to undertake suicide missions.
It is not as if the entire local populations believes in the Taliban and Al Qaeda ideology and has been complete won over. Intimidation and the systematic dissemination of fear is a key element in their strategy. The growth in their support base during the last four years has also led to the dismantling of traditional tribal power structures.
Pro-government tribal and religious leaders are murdered and those who remain do not speak out because of a clear and persistent threat to their lives. The traditional leaders had sided with the government when Musharraf signed peace agreements with the Taliban. But, thereafter the Army abandoned its policing role, packed up and left the area thinking lasting peace had been achieved. They now feel threatened and deserted and are not ready to risk their lives.
Intimidation has silenced local opposition to the militants and the elements opposing them remain weak, scattered and unprotected. Attempts, half-hearted though, to root out terrorists from the tribal areas face resistance, also from a section of the local Islamists, who are a direct beneficiary of the largesse doled out by Al Qaeda and Taliban.
The extremist elements have considerably strengthened themselves after the peace deal were signed. This explains the heavy casualties suffered by the Army in the current operations, which are limited in nature. Since the influence of the government is non-existent in the Waziristan region, the militant networks have expanded their public contact campaign to recruit mercenaries to fight NATO and Afghan forces in Afghanistan.
Scores of "jihadis" recruited from Karak, Bannu, Lakki, Dera and Tank areas are sent in batches in the training camps in Wana in southern Waziristan. The activities of these lawless elements have led to basic changes in the life of the people who are forced to follow a strict code.
A total absence of governance and the Army's presence for years has made the people vulnerable and enslaved them. Things do not look like changing despite the current limited military action taken, obviously, in response to US pressure.
MK Dhar, NPA
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